THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE IN PENAL
LAW: AN ATTEMPTED JUSTIFICATION
PatrickJ. Fitzgerald*
When philosophizing in the study, we should be careful, it has been
said, not to leave our common sense (along with our umbrellas) out in
the hall. And in discussing the present topic we must beware of
forgetting our criminology. The way in which the average discussion
concentrates on state practice and its justification in terms of
international law, completely overlooking the criminological aspects of
the problem, can be seen from the following typical quotations:
[A]s a matter of convenience crimes should be dealt with by those states
whose social order is most closely affected, and in general this will be
the state on whose territory the crimes are committed . . . . [Tihe
territorial state has the strongest interest, the greatest facilities and the
most powerful instruments for repressing crimes

. . .

committed.

within its territory.'
The third group [of states] rejects the territorial principle, and seems to
base its law on the theory that crime, wherever committed, is a social
2
evil which all civilized states are interested in suppressing.
To say that the penal laws of a country can bind foreigners and regulate
their conduct, either in their own or in any other foreign country, is to
assert a jurisdiction over such countries and to impair their
3
independence.

Such comments show the emphasis placed upon practical considerations like power, convenience and state interest. They show, too, a
failure to justify a state's extraterritorial enforcement of its penal law
in moral terms and vis-a-vis individuals. At first sight this failure seems
excusable: this is a question for moralists, philosophers and penologists,
not for international lawyers. Unfortunately penologists are too
concerned with the general justification of the inter-territorial criminal
law to trouble themselves about its extraterritorial application. As a
result, the job of providing moral justification for such an application
never gets done. Consequently the penologist misses valuable insights
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which this kind of limiting case can throw on the central problem. At the
same time, the international lawyer forgets that international rules about
state criminal law, like the criminal law itself, ultimately involve
individuals, and that the moral justification required for such rules
concerns not so much the relations between the enforcing state and other
states, but the relation between the enforcing state and the individuals
against whom it is intervening.
Traditional justification in terms of interstate relationships is not
enough. To show that the territorial principle is justifiable as between
States ?...... n on various grounds is not even to begin to show that it is
justifiable as between those states on the one hand and Individuals
1...... n on the other. To argue that State A can justifiably punish X, a
national of State B, for an act committed on the high seas against its
own national Y, on the ground that a state can rightfully protect its
nationals abroad, or to argue the contrary on the ground that this would
lead to jurisdictional anarchy, is to argue on a single plane. Indeed this
is the least important plane. It is simple to argue that State A can or
cannot do this without infringing the legal rights and interests of other
states, yet the major problem surely is whether State A can punish X
without infringing the moral right of X himself. In other words, does the
overall justification of a penal law justify its extraterritorial application?
But why justify the criminal law at all? Can we not take it as given, as
a practice found generally in societies and states? The answer is that
penal law involves inflicting suffering on individuals. To prohibit
conduct and punish its commission lessens the freedom of both those
who are punished and those who are deterred. For the purpose of this
discussion I take it as axiomatic that the gratuitous infliction of
suffering is wrong and that the infliction of pain calls for justification
because it is a prima facie evil. 4 It follows that the practice of
punishment in general, and the criminal law in particular, stands in need
of defense. If A assaults B, what moral right has C to intervene against
A? Would there be a greater moral right for a group of C's to
intervene? Would such a group be in a stronger moral position if it
constituted a state? Would a group of states have a better moral title? Or
is the group, the state and the community of states each a case of a chain
being no stronger than its weakest link?
Justifications of criminal law and punishment fall basically into two
'I take this as axiomatic, not because it cannot be established, but because space does not allow
for its establishment here. That it can be established has been shown by a variety of recent writings
in the field of moral philosophy; see, e.g., Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in THE Is/

OUGHT QUESTION 196 (W. Hudson ed. 1969); Foot, Goodness and Choice, in THE is/OuGor
QUESTION 214 (W. Hudson ed. 1969).
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kinds, depending on whether or not the institution is defended in terms of
self-interest. According to the former view, we have a right to punish
criminals as a means of protecting ourselves. Thus, criminal law
becomes a weapon in the armory of self-defense. The alternative view is
that punishing criminals is either good in itself or is a means to some
goal which is unconnected with self-interest, but yet of some intrinsic
value.
The oldest and most obvious version of the second argument is. the
contention that crimes deserve to be punished. The retributive doctrine is
that there is intrinsic value in seeing that criminals get their just deserts.
Wrong doing has upset the moral reckoning and the accounts must be
put right. According to this view, a state may, and should, preserve the
balance of justice. However,
[tjhe difficulty with this suggestion is that of discovering the
justification for this. If one man does some wrong or immoral act, it is
not easy to see what right another man has to exact retribution for this.
Edgar Wallace's "four just men" and other fictitious private agencies
of justice might be said to be justified in punishing wrongdoers in order
to prevent them committing further harm, but for one man to play at
being god and to ensure that wrong should reap its reward involves an
assumption of rights over others which surely needs positive
justification. Such justification is hard to find and indeed few would
seek to support such activities. But if individuals have no moral right to
exact retribution ilis hard to see how a society, a group of individuals,
can acquire such a moral right either.
What holds good of retribution likewise holds good of expiation and
atonement. The idea of expiation and atonement is that the wrongdoer
by suffering pays the debt demanded by justice and owed to the
authority inflicting the suffering, and so becomes reconciled once more
with that authority. We see this idea at work in the conception of noneternal divine punishments. It is sometimes said that punishment for
crime enables the criminals to "pay their due in the hard coinage of
punishment." The difficulty of justifying state measures aimed at
making an offender pay such a debt is the difficulty of showing that this
debt is owed to society. Just as it is hard to show that society any more
than an individual is entitled to exact retribution, so it is difficult to
show that society any more than an individual has a right that the
offender should make expiation and atonement to it for his
wrongdoing. With Blackstone we may urge that atonement and
expiation should be left to the Supreme Being. 5
1P.
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An alternative approach might be to argue that it is morally defensible
to punish wrongdoers in order to "'makethe world a better place." This
is not simply a claim that we can rightly punish people to deter them
from committing crimes against us or in our society, but rather, without
reference to any self-interest, this is an abstract assertion that it is
justifiable to take steps to promote justice and virtue and to reduce
wrongdoing simply because this should bring about a more desirable
state of affairs. This argument is attractive because it avoids the
metaphysical, if not theological, character of pure retribution and
regards punishment as a means rather than an end in itself. All the same
it is fatally open to the objections raised against retributivism. Suppose
in Erewhon some highwaymen are robbing, assaulting and murdering
people on the highways. Now there is no doubt that if X, a native of
Utopia were to utilize his private crime disposal agency to apprehend
and punish these highwaymen, Erewhon would become a safer and more
pleasant place. Assuming, however, that X's help has not been invited by
the Erenwhonians and that his services, therefore, are given quite
gratuitously, and remembering that his activities will bear hardly on the
highwaymen, we must ask "What right has X to officiously make
Erewhon a nicer place at the expense of the highwaymen?" We can
rationalize that the Erewhonians will be grateful to X, thus ratifying his
conduct and adopting it as their own, or we can oppose the move by
hypothesizing that the Erewhonians have no strong views on the matter
or that they even resent X's intrusion. In the latter case what possible
title has X to the role of playing God?
There are attractions in improving the world as a hobby, but when it is
at the expense of other people they must be resisted. Quite apart from the
impossibility of establishing any moral right to indulge such a hobby,
there are certain important and less theoretical dangers. If the aim is to
make the world a better place, the question arises "better in whose
opinion-that of the improver or that of the man at whose expense the
improvement is to be made?" And of course in the former's opinion, the
world might well be vastly improved by the latter's removal altogether.
One last question arises regarding non-self-interest justifications of
penal law:
Could there be any right which is available to the state, but unavailable
to an individual, to inflict punishment to further the aim of retribution
• . .or to render the world a better place?
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As regards retribution in and of itself a state seems to be in no better
position than an individual. Even granted the fact that we understand
that wrongdoing is supposed to be redressed by suffering, it would be
untenable to argue that it is the right of a state to enforce such redress.
The answer to the second part of the question is more difficult. Making
the world better (e.g., making it safe for democracy, safe from drugs,
high-jacking, etc.) seems to be something not altogether outside the
justifiable activities of a state. If Utopia moves to stamp out drugtrafficking in Erewhon or on the high seas to bring about a better state
of affairs (i.e., a drug-free world), this appears to be perhaps morally
defensible. But the reason, we should notice, is the underlying possibility
implicit in the example-that a drug-free Erewhon and drug-free seas
will also preserve Utopia itself from the menace of narcotics. State
moves in this direction seem more tolerable because they can be
connected with self-protection. Given a situation where there was no
evidence that criminal activity in State A could have any effect on State
B, it would then become very difficult to justify the latter's intervention.
It would be difficult, for example, to find any moral title to support
Albania's clamping down hard on Norwegian tax evaders.
From the above we see that states are no more justified than
individuals in inflicting punishment, for altruistic reasons. Justification
must be sought on the basis of self-interest. Of the different strands in
the self-interest argument, I shall consider only two. The first is the
relatively simple view that since individuals have, within reason, the right
to defend themselves against certain kinds of wrongdoing, particularly
those involving physical violence, so too groups of individuals and, a
fortiori, societies are entitled to collective self-defense. The second,
more sophisticated view reasons that society is a necessary requirement
for men. Therefore, men are morally entitled to set up, live in and protect societies. Society, however, would be logically impossible without
certain fundamental rules. Both in a factual and a logical sense, a society
could not exist without rules restricting violence and prohibiting
falsehood. A state of affairs in which every man's hand could be turned
against his neighbor and in which truth holds no primacy of respect
would be unfit for social life and linguistic communication, and,
however else we described it, we could not describe it as a society. Given
the necessity for such rules, a society and its members have some right to
preserve the rules in order to preserve the society. This in turn licenses
some form of intervention against those who violate the rules and
endanger society.
This does not mean that any and every society has a right to self-
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preservation. A society dedicated to piracy, to the harrassment of
neighboring territories and to the torture of minorities within its borders
could show little moral title to continue to exist without changes. Nor
would a society be justified in enforcing the observance of any and every
rule to protect itself against every sort of attack. Just as there are limits
to an individual's right of self-defense, so are there limits to the
corresponding right of a society. The fact that X is put out by Y's
competition or by Z's expression of views which differ from X's in no
way entitles X to use force against Y or Z in "self-defense." Likewise,
the fact that persons outside a particular society live according to a
different pattern from those within it (e.g., they practice polygamy or
worship fire) is no ground for intervention by those within the society in
question. Furthermore, the fact that some people within a society may
hold and express views which differ from the established wisdom on a
variety of topics ranging from religion to education by no means justifies
their being disciplined and put down. To say that a society, given no
immorality in its own objectives, has a right to protect itself by
upholding certain necessary rules only indicates the general direction of
social use of penal sanctions.
To spell out in detail how far a society can rightly go in enforcing its
rules lies beyond this paper. For the purpose of this discussion let me
merely draw a distinction between four types of rules operating in
society. First there are fundamental rules-rules so necessary to social
life as to amount to preconditions of society (e.g., rules against violence
and rules about truth). We can clearly see the justification of sanctions
for violations of such rules, remembering that sanctions need not
necessarily be institutionalised: ostracism and other informal
punishments may be quite effective as the main sanctions against lying.
Next come neutral rules-rules to deal with situations where some rule is
necessary though several alternatives are possible and equally acceptable
(e.g., the rule of the road). With these situations, no moral, logical or
natural ground exists for, choosing one side or the other, but uniformity
is essential. Here, too, sanctions can be clearly justified. Given that a
society accepts road traffic, it has a right and a duty to regulate the
traffic so as to keep accidents below an intolerable level. Indeed, in many
ways death on the roads is a greater social problem than murder. Then
we have auxiliary rules, and most rules fall within this third category.
These rules are neither fundamental nor neutrally necessary, but life in a
Singer, Moral Rules and Principles, in
1958).
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society would be far less bearable without them. Road traffic again gives
an example: speed limits are not absolutely essential and one could get
by without them, but at certain times and in certain places, roads might
well be less safe without them. Environmental laws as a whole (e.g., laws
restricting noise, pollution of the atmosphere, etc.) fall into this
category. While they serve to protect the quality of social life, they are
not indispensable to that life-as yet. However, I would be surprised if
this will still be the case at the turn of the century, when pollution of the
land by pesticide, of the rivers and seas by oils and other effluents, and of
the atmosphere by smoke and other gases may well make these laws
more necessary than those against assaulting, wounding and murdering.
Finally come residual rules, which societies observe for a variety of
reasons and whose violation can be stigmatized as incorrect. Included
within this category are dress, etiquette, spelling, grammar and a host of
other rules that resulted partly from custom and partly from reason and
principle. Here also, there are occasions when some rule is necessary
though any rule would do, providing we stick to it. This may well be the
case with spelling, where the only thing to be avoided is orthographical
chaos. In many cases, however, these rules seem entirely
dispensable-the bulk of Emily Post's prescriptions and maybe the bulk
of English grammar (what there is of it) could be jettisoned, and life
might well improve. This may also be true of some rules which have been
elevated to laws: laws against working on Sunday, against swearing and
blasphemy, against bigamy and against certain types of indecency.
These may once have been, or were thought to have been, necessary but
in my view are quite plainly no longer so.
Of these four types of rules, then, the first three clearly merit social
enforcement. I would argue, however, that enforcement of the fourth
type is not only unjustified but is counter productive and harmful to
society. Enforcing petty and futile laws makes an ass of the law, brings
the whole legal system into contempt, and therefore threatens the
continued enforcement of other rules more vital to society. 7
Yet the drawing of this distinction between the types of rules operating
in society cannot be the sole justification for the institution of
punishment as it exists within a modern state. To do this one would first
have to consider just what sort of goal can be justified within the general
context of social self-defense. The second consideration would be by
what means the goal can be accomplished. A third and entirely separate
consideration would be the price.
1P.
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On these questions I can do no more than indicate what would be my
own approach. Given, say, that violence must be prevented in general,
the question arises whether a society's goal ought to be as total a
suppression as the economy allows. A second alternative might be some
form of reduction to what might be deemed a tolerable level. This could
be consistent with Quetelet's thesis that crime is a toll which we pay
annually.8 A third possible goal might be a reduction plus learning to live
with violence as an inescapable evil, much as parents, thanks to Dr.
Spock, have learned to live with their three year old's rambunctiousness,
rather than fight it, or as invalids have learned to live with their
disabilities. A fourth aim might be a reduction plus recognition that
crimes and rule violations may, as Durkheim and others suggest, have
positive value. Violence is said to be a creative force, because conflictfree societies may lack committment, variety or dynamism. The answer
to the question of what society's goal ought to be calls for more concern
for criminological and sociological theory than is generally found
among those most closely concerned with the penal law and its
enforcement. My own view is that while precision bombing may not
work in armed conflict, something analogous might well pay dividends
in criminal law. Attacks by lawmakers aimed at certain major offenses
on a narrow point with selected targets may possibly be the best way for
a society to defend its rules, maximize freedom and initiative among
individuals, minimize expense and remain open to change and
development.
The means to be used is generally thought only to pose the problem of
how to obtain the best mixture of deterrence and reform. The more you
keep your sights on the potentia) offender the more you overlook the
defendant; and the more you overlook him, the better chance you have of
breeding yourself a recidivist. Yet the more you individualize the penalty
for the offender and move from deterence to reform, the less effect you
have on the potential offender. On this subject let me content myself with
two remarks. First, less is known about the deterrent value of
punishment than we might wish. This emerges from discussions on the
death penalty. Secondly, to view the problem as a conflict between the
needs of the actual offender and those of the potential offender who
requires a deterence is to overlook completely the needs of that much
larger group in society consisting of neither actual nor potential
offenders. At certain times and in certain places it has been argued that
one function of punishment is to satisfy the public demand for justice.
'1. JONES, CRIME AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 116 (3d ed. 1965).
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One objection to this claim is that the mere existence of a demand to see
justice done on the surface carries no more moral title to gratification
than do many other of our desires, such as avarice or lust. An
alternative, advanced by Professor Morton, 9 views the main service of
the criminal trial as that of a modern day morality play-a drama in
which society can see the emphatic and authoritative underlining of its
own basic views that certain types of conduct are unsupportable. In this
way the criminal law, along with other forces, helps to maintain and
continue that process of internalization begun during childhood in the
home and in the school. Proof of the validity of Morton's thesis would
take long and painstaking research, but it may well be that this theory
points to the greatest success of the criminal law. It may well be that in
reality conviction and sentencing has less to say to actual or potential
offenders than to the ordinary law abiding citizen, just as posthumous
awards for military valour serve less to inspire others to heroic feats than
to preserve in the rest of us a healthy respect for bravery, or as
canonization aims less to inspire to sanctity than to foster regard for
virtue among ordinary people.
Finally, there is the price we pay. Here one particularly thinks of three
things. One thinks of the conflict between the need to individualize
punishment to best fit the particular case with an eye to the future reform
of the offender and the requirement that like cases receive like treatment.
Secondly, one thinks of the problems of strict and vicarious liability.
Thirdly, one thinks of the limitations arising from considerations of
humanity and proportion. Humanity rules out certain penalties as being
too barbarous for infliction by any civilized society. Proportion requires
that the penalty, however effective, must not be out of balance with the
severity of the offense. Death for illegal parking would certainly be out
of this count, if not on the first.
Under this program we may then, at last, begin to attack the problem
of the territorial principle. The questions we may ask are these:
1. Given the above justification for the general criminal law, would a
society organized as a state be justified in enforcing its penal law
against all criminal acts within its territory?
2. Could a society ever be justified, in a general moral way and vis-avis individuals rather than states, in using its law to punish acts
committed outside its territory?
Many publicists seem to accept completely the validity of the
'J.
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territorial and active nationality principles and to some extent accept
that of the protective and universal principles. These publicists, however,
generally reject the passive nationality principle.
Now the first of the two questions posed above, relating solely to the
territorial principle, can be dealt with relatively quickly. Given the right
of the individual to society, the necessity of certain-rules and the
consequent right of society and its members to enforce these rules, it
follows that there is a right to punish infractions of these rules. What
counts as an infraction will depend on the spatial extent of the society. If
X, a member of a west European society, say England, uses violence in
Brazil on a Brazilian, this could hardly qualify as a breach of any
English social rule (though the same may not hold true of English law)
against violence, any more than an Englishman who drops his aitches
when speaking German could be said to have broken a rule of the
English language. Still less would use of violence by a Brazilian against a
compatriot in Brazil amount to a violation of England's rules prohibitng
violence. Another way of putting it is that you can only break rules
which apply to you-a point touched upon by Brierly when he argued
that"... it is essential to the very notion of a crime that the act should
be a contravention of some law to which the accused is subject . . .,.
Quite clearly, however, the rules will apply to everyone within the
territory of the society. In the case of England, the rules will apply to
U.K. citizens living in the realm, but they will also apply to noncitizens.
The English rule against violence is equally broken by any murder
committed in England regardless of the murder's citizenship. But while
international law accepts that aliens are subject to the law of the
receiving state and while on a moral and philosophical plane this seems
obviously justifiable, we should note that this is true basically because
generally everyone within a state's territory forms part of one whole
society. Given a situation where in one area there are two or more
distinct societies, identified by race, religion or language, the case would
be different. Suppose in the same territory there lived white men, brown
men and yellow men with each sector forming a third of the population
and each sector being scattered throughout the whole territory but each
dealing exclusively with its own members. In this case we might well
want to say that if one white man assaulted another, this infringed only
the rules of the white society which alone was threatened by such
conduct. The overall territorial rule would come into play only if the
white man assaulted a brown or yellow man. Given then this kind of
'Brierly, The "Lotus' Case,44 L.Q. REv. 154,161 (1928).
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almost total social separation, if each society constituted a state sharing
the same territory with the two other states, we might have a situation
where the automatic application of a state's penal law to every act within
the territory would not be justifiable. But this, of course, is far from the
normal case. In the normal case such application is clearly right.
Can we go further and justify any of the other principles? Can we
defend a state's extension of its criminal law? The general justification of
the criminal law as a means used by society to protect itself leads well
beyond the territorial principle. Although acts outside its territory may
in general be of no concern to a state, when they cause harm to the state,
it may be entitled to protect itself against them. I say "may" because
not every harm-causing act will necessarily justify a counterattack. Just
as there are some activities which may cause harm to an individual
without entitling him to prevent them by force, so there are limitations
on a state's right of social defense. In the case of individual self-defense,
one draws a contrast between cases of assault and robbery on the one
hand and business competition, argument and disagreement on the
other. The analogous contrast in the case of the state is not between
attacks on its territorial integrity on the one hand and commercial alliances against it on the other. These acts are by other states, and our concern is the acts of individuals. The proper contrast is between acts of
individuals clearly likely to cause physical damage to persons or property in the state's territory (e.g., the ship's captain who lets loose an oil
slick which will clearly endanger a neighboring coast) and acts which
may cause loss of income or of face without physical damage (e.g.,
foreign traders who compete with the home state's traders in world
markets and journalists and commentators who comment adversely on
affairs in the home state). I would argue that a state would be completely justified in using the sanctions of its penal law against the oil slick type
of case. Further one can imagine cases where such sanctions would be
justified even though the offender's act was committed in the territory of
another state rather than on the high seas.
In arguing this, I would like to make three caveats. Firstly, I am
speaking here simply from the point of view of the relation between the
state and the offender. What I am saying is that the ship's captain in the
above example has no right to complain if punished. That the position
will be affected by the possible rights of the captain's own state and by
interstate rules, we are well aware. I am ignoring these in order to look at
considerations of which we are not so well aware. Secondly, the example
of the captain and the oil slick might, perhaps, be said to be a case of the
objective territorial principle rather than of the protective principle.
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Thirdly, in picking out types of harms against which the state can
rightfully invoke its penal law, what criterion can we use? I take these
last two points together since they are connected.
It is arguable that the oil slick case can be looked on as equally
suitable for application of the protective principle. It can further be
argued that the difference between pure territorial principle cases (i.e.,
murder within the territory) and obvious protective principle cases (i.e.,
counterfeiting a foreign country's currency) is only one of a degree; that
is, that there is a continuum half way along which lie the objective
territorial principle cases. But the kind of harmful act done abroad
against which a state is entitled to protect itself is hard to elucidate. How
is one to differentiate between forging English pound notes and
underbidding English firms in foreign markets, when both will cause
England economic losses? It is little help to distinguish. between
justifiable and unjustifiable harm. Nor is there much usefulness to be
obtained from the Harvard formulation "provided that the act. . . was
not committed in the exercise of a liberty guaranteed. . . by the [lex loci

delicti]."" For one thing, the guarantee of a liberty by the lex loci is no
guarantee that the act is morally justifiable; it is at best an indication.
For instance, it is not logically impossible to have a law stating that
counterfeiting home currency is a crime but that counterfeiting foreign
currency is not an offense. The term "guaranteed" is also unfortunate if
it suggests that the lex loci must positively state that one may do the act
for the act to be justified. The notion that one may do only what the law
allows is less liberal than the principle that one is only debarred from
doing what the law forbids. But perhaps the best way to approach the
problem of drawing the line would be to start with clear examples of
deliberate attacks of a physical kind (e.g., on the territory, ships,
airplanes or in some cases on nationals of a foreign state). One could
then move on to deliberate, but non-physical attacks on the institutions
of the state (e.g., currency forgeries), and look step by step at less
obvious cases until reaching the case of an economic competition that is
clearly justifiable conduct despite the financial harm it may cause.
During this inquiry it must be kept in mind that the more deliberate,
direct and physical the harm is, the clearer is the entitlement to the selfprotection provided by criminal law.
This leads to a question already suggested: at what point would an
attack on the national of a state qualify as an attack on the state itself
and thus justify Lotus treatment? It is often said that an attack on a
"Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, art. 7, 29 AM. J.INT'L L. Supp. 439,440 (1935).
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state's national is not an attack on the state, but this is not true. The
truth is neither that it is, nor that it is not; the truth is that it may be.
There is a substantial difference between the French couple who
murdered an Englishman on holiday in France and the escaped English
prisoner of war whose personal contribution to Britain's war effort was
to kill a German a day. In the first case X and Y kill Z, who happens
simply to be English. If English authorities punished X and Y in the
unlikely event of their going to England, would this deter foreigners from
killing Englishment abroad? And is the murder victim's nationality of
much interest to, or even known by, his killer? Contrast this with the
second example where the nationality of the victims was the whole point
of the killings. This act was an attack on Germany, and indeed was so
meant to be. In this extreme sort of case I would maintain that the
victim's state is quite entitled to use its penal law to defend itself against
such attacks.12 However, where the nationality of the victim is incidental,
there is no justification for invoking the passive nationality principle.
Cases involving an attack on a state's national might well fall under
the universal principle, particularly if the acts were committed in the
regime of the res nullius. The justification for punishing piracy on the
high seas, in accordance with the universal principle and regardless of the
nationality on the offenders, is not simply that otherwise piracy would
escape punishment or that every state has an interest in suppressing
crime. Rather, the justification is that if pirates infest the high seas, then
the members of different state societies are being denied free and
peaceable use of the sea, and this is a denial which they are entitled to
repel. In reality the universal principle is not far apart from the
protective principle. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that X kills Y,
a fellow explorer, at the North Pole. Is this really of much concern to
Y's state or any other state? Yet suppose travel acr 6 ss the North Pole
becomes far more common and suppose that a group of bandits
frequently attack and kill people crossing the Pole. This now turns into
an attack on safe travel. It is thus an attack on all states and arouses
their concern accordingly.
As time goes on, I would hazard the prediction that the universal
principle will become even more important with the growth of the need
to protect the environment against depletion and pollution. Meanwhile it
is worth observing that this principle cannot necessarily be justified on
121n the actual case in mind (that of a distinguished Second World War pilot of the R A.F., who

shall remain nameless) the murders were committed in Germany, but one can hypothesise a case
where they are committed in neutral countries.
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the ground that this action is an example of a group of states engaging in
social defense. The "group of states" argument holds only as a
justification for moves against other states, just as the "group of
individuals" social defense argument justifies using only the criminal
law against individuals. One reason it may not justify moves against
individuals is the fact that the fundamental basis of the social defense
theory that society is necessary for man is not applicable to groups of
states. Societies of states are neither necessary for states nor for men.
Logically and in fact, state existence could continue in isolation;
individual life could not-at least not for any appreciable time.
We come finally to a principle that seems generally accepted without
question, but which I, nevertheless, find difficult: the active nationality
principle. "A state has a right to punish its own nationals." Vis-a-vis
other states perhaps yes, but what about vis-a-vis the individuals
themselves? Suppose X, an Englishman, kills Y, a Frenchman, in
Switzerland. Most writers maintain that Switzerland has the main right
to punish X, that England has the next best right and that France might
have some right. I n my view, the case for Switzerland is obvious, that for
France can be argued, and that for England is untenable. If the
justification for society's punishment of crime is the attack on society
involved in the criminal act, then it is hard to see how X's conduct
constitutes an attack on his own society.
It could be argued that a society, like a club, is entitled to discipline its
members, but there are difficulties in this. Firstly, is it justifiable and in
accordance with reality to equate membership in a society with the
possession of a nationality? X may have lived in Switzerland for 50
years, retaining only his nationality. X might not even know he was a
British subject. Secondly, the analogy between a state society and a club
is misleading. One need not join the club, and one is certainly not born
into it. Moreover, the ultimate sanction of the club is mere expulsion.
Thirdly, what is the justification for society's claim to discipline its
members? Surely the only justification is that members who break the
rules are a danger to society, either because rule breaking done at home
harms society or its members, or because rule breaking done abroad
makes the breaker a potential danger when he' returns. A man who
commits murder abroad may well do the same at home, but this
justification has nothing whatever to do with nationality. This
justification, which has much to commend it, would license a state's
punishment of any individual living within it for committing a violent
crime abroad regardless of the individual's citizenship. But it would not
license the punishment by a state of its national for a violent crime
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committed abroad if the national did not live in, had not returned to, and
had no intention of ever returning to that state. As in many other areas
the link of nationality here is a vastly overrated and inflated concept.
My conclusion, then, is that a social defense theory can serve several
useful functions. It can provide a justification for the territorial,
protective and universal principles. Moreover, it suggests some
justification for the passive nationality principle. Finally, it implies that
the active nationality principle is without any justification.

